We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions.
Introduction
This paper considers the model of Internet-style trade which can be described as follows. There are a mediator, a large population of buyers, and a seller who has a single object for sale. We assume that the seller cannot deal directly with buyers, instead, the trade must be mediated. At the initial period 0, the mediator establishes a trade procedure (conventionally called "auction mechanism") through which she is allowed to collect some part of the trade surplus. 1 The seller observes the auction mechanism and decides either to consume the object, or to put it for sale. If the object is consumed, the games ends. If the object is put for sale at period t ≥ 1, a set of n buyers is drawn randomly from the buyers' population and the auction takes place.
There are two important features in our model. First, whenever the seller fails to sell the object, he is allowed to offer it for (re-)sale again, as many times as he wants. Secondly, in every trade the seller faces a different set of bidders drawn from a large population.
We characterize the class of mediator-optimal mechanisms, where the mediator commits to a mechanism in advance and is not allowed to change it during the game. Moreover, we demonstrate how to implement an optimal mechanism. It turns out that the closing-fee Internet auction is one of such mechanisms. In the closing-fee Internet auction, the seller (repeatedly) sells the object via a Vickrey auction. In every auction he selects a reserve price and, if the object is sold, pays to the mediator a closing fee (a percentage of the closing price). The fee is selected by the mediator in advance, it is commonly known and fixed through the entire trade process.
There are important implications of our results. The mediated trade can 1 By an auction mechanism we understand a game with incomplete information set up by the mediator and played by the traders in which a desirable outcome occurs as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
be viewed as a principal-agent model, where the mediator (the principal) designs an incentive mechanism for the seller (the agent) such that behavior of the seller maximizes the mediator's payoff. The standard principal-optimal solution of the principal-agent model is that the principal collects a fixed fee from the agent, and after that the agent maximizes his payoff. If there is uncertainty of the agent's type, then the principal prefers to use a more sophisticated mechanism which makes the agent to report her type truthfully and which discriminates between the agents of different types. In contrast, in our model the mediator-optimal solution is to collect a percentage of the seller's payoff rather than a fixed fee, and, even though there is uncertainty of the seller's type, the only discrimination in effect is that the sellers are divided into two groups with respect to their use values: Those who are willing to auction the object and those who are not. Surprisingly, the existence of an auction mediator, an independent player whose influence on strategic behavior of traders is essential, is not illuminated in the literature. The up-to-date research concentrates on mechanisms which achieve ex-post efficiency or which maximize the seller's revenue (for overview see, e.g., Krishna 2002, Chapter 5) . In contrast, we focus on the question of optimal mechanisms for the mediator. This question has a profound relevance to the problem of maximizing profit by giant commercial trade-mediating institutions which run internet auctions (e.g., eBay, Yahoo, Amazon).
Our two main assumptions are consistent with the real-life observations. Indeed, a seller has the re-sale option in real life and this option has essential impact on players' strategic behavior, as noted, for example, by Fudenberg at al. (1985) , Milgrom (1987) , Gupta and Lebrun (1999) , Haile (2000 Haile ( , 2003 .
Our second assumption: the seller faces a different set of bidders drawn from a large population in each period -is new and crucial for our analysis. We think that it is a realistic assumption for Internet auctions. In contrast, the existing literature on auctions with resale assumes that there is the same set of bidders in all auctions, which implies that the optimal reserve price declines due to Bayesian updating of the bidders' private values distribution after every auction (see Fudenberg at al., 1985 ; McAfee and Vincent, 1997).
The first related work that we are aware of is Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) who analyze a bilateral trade mediated by a "broker", assuming that the traders have independent private values for the traded good. In particular, Myerson and Satterthwaite describe a direct revelation 2 mechanism for the broker which maximizes her payoff subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for the traders. A variety of works extends Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the study of two-sided markets mediated by "platforms", starting with the double auction of Wilson (1985) and including (but not limited to) Rochet The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize the mediator-optimal mechanisms. Section 4 describes a simple implementation of the optimal mechanism which has applications for many Internet auctions. In Section 5 we present some extensions of our model. Section 6 discusses assumptions of the model. The Appendix contains omitted proofs. 2 A mechanism is direct if the traders are asked to report their "types", i.e., their private values. Further, it is revelation (or truthful ) if it is a Nash equilibrium for the traders to reveal their values truthfully.
The Model
We consider a model of repeated auctions where a seller can re-auction the object in the next period, if the object is not sold in the current period. In contrast to the standard problem where the seller auctions the object one and only one time, in our model the seller may decide not to sell the object at all, or to re-auction it (infinitely) many times, until it is sold. The model is designed to capture Internet-style auctions. At period t = 0, a mediator chooses a trade mechanism which will be used thereafter in the game.
At period t = 1, 2, . . . a random sample of n buyers is selected from population N . The seller either consumes the object (and the game ends) or puts it for sale (and the game proceeds to period t + 1). At period t + 1, the object is allocated and the payments are transferred according to the selected mechanism. If the object is sold to one of the buyers, the game ends.
Otherwise, a new random sample of n buyers is selected from population N and the seller either consumes the object (and the game ends) or puts it for sale and so on.
We make the following assumptions. Assumption 3. There is a discount factor δ, 0 < δ ≤ 1, common for all players. We assume that if the seller decides to auction the object at period t, an outcome of the auction is determined in the next period t + 1. Thus, payoffs of all players obtained at period t + 1 are discounted by δ relative to period t.
Assumption 4. The mediator chooses a mechanism only once at period t = 0. The mechanism depends only on the current-period reports, i.e., it is independent of time and the history of play. 
is the probability that bidder i gets the object, i = 1, . . . , n, p 0 (w t ) = 1 − P n i=1 p i (w t ) is the probability that the seller retains the object; x i (w t ) is a payment of bidder i = 1, . . . , n to the mediator, and x 0 (w t ) is a payment of the mediator to the seller. Note that for every i = 1, . . . , n, x i is allowed to be non-zero even if buyer i does not receive the object.
Let h t = (w 1 , . . . , w t ) be the history of play up to time t. A symmetric bidding strategy of a bidder, ω :
, is her bid as a function of her actual use value. 4 A seller's strategy
.. ¢ specifies the probability, α t+1 , that the seller auctions the object at period t + 1
and his bid, q t+1 , as a function of history h t and his use value v 0 . Denote
is stationary if q t = q 1 and α t = α 1 for all t = 1, 2, . . .. Since the mechanism (p, x) does not vary with t, there exists a stationary seller's strategy (q * , α * ) and a bidders' strategy ω * which constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (Revelation Principle) Given a mechanism (p, x) and a stationary equilibrium (ω * , (q * , α * )) of the correspondent game, there exists a direct revelation mechanism (p 0 , x 0 ) which has a payoff-equivalent stationary
Without loss of generality we assume that (p, x) is a direct revelation mechanism. Fix (p, x) and consider period t. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of bidders drawn at random from the population N at period t. Let For every i = 0, 1, . . . , n denote byp i (w) the probability of i to obtain (retain for i = 0) the object, conditional on i's value v i ,
Also, for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n denote byx i (v i ) the expected payment of buyer i to the mediator (from the mediator to the seller for i = 0) conditional on
Then, the expected utility of bidder i = 1, . . . , n is defined by
The discount factor δ appears here because of our assumption that if an auction starts at period t, the players are "locked in" until period t + 1, when the auction outcome is realized. Thus, payoffs of the bidders are discounted by one period.
The expected seller's gain from the auction is defined by
That is, at period t the seller gives up the object of value v 0 (the first term of the right-hand side of (2)) and at period t + 1 he obtains the discounted payoff, the sum of the expected paymentx 0 (v 0 ) and, if the object is not sold, the value of the object v 0 and the next-period expected gain from the
Finally, the expected utility of the mediator is defined by
A direct revelation mechanism is feasible if it satisfies the following constraints:
(a) Individual rationality. For each period t = 1, 2, . . . and each buyer i = 1, . . . , n, and each v i ∈ [0, 1]
and for each v 0 ∈ [0, 1]
The constraint (5) means that the seller expects to obtain a non-negative gain whenever he assigns a positive probability on auctioning the object, 
where U t i (w i |v i ) is the expected utility of trader i = 0, 1, . . . , n if she reports w i when her true use value is v i , that is, for each i = 1, . . . , n
and
Note that by Assumption 2 the next-period expected payoff U t+1 0 (v 0 ) does not depend on the current report w 0 .
3 Mediator-optimal Mechanisms 3.1 Seller's Decision to Auction the Object Let CV * be the discounted continuation value of the seller who always auctions the object,
Note that CV * is independent from v 0 , because the object is never consumed.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the seller's decision to auction the object at period t depends on the discounted continuation value, CV * , in the following
and for each v 0 < CV * and each t = 1, 2, . . .
Proof. By stationarity, Note that CV * = v 0 is a zero probability event, thus without any effect on the result we can assume α t (v 0 ) = 1 for this case.
The game ends in the first period, if the sellers' use value is higher than the discounted continuation value from the auction, v 0 > CV * . In the next subsection we analyze the situation where v 0 ≤ CV * , when the seller auctions the object until it is sold.
Analysis of a Stage Game
Fix the seller's realized use value v 0 ≤ CV * and period t. Denote by U * M , the expected payoff of the mediator at any period t, conditional on v 0 ≤ CV * .
Note that
We now characterize the set of all feasible mechanisms as a function of U * M and CV * . Denote by C b (v i ) the virtual value of bidder i, i = 1, . . . , n,
The 
We have the following result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the seller's realized use value v 0 satisfies v 0 ≤ CV * . Then at any period t ≥ 1, every feasible mechanism (p, x) satisfies
Theorem 1 characterizes the mediator-optimal mechanisms for a given CV * . Denote by Z * the joint expected gain of the seller and the mediator, Z * = U * M + CV * . Clearly, in order to maximize U * M for a given CV * , it suffices to maximize Z * . Proof. Let
Note that
Then we can rewrite z = Q * (z) as follows,
We have T (0) > 0 and T (1) = 0 (because C b (·) ≤ 1). Note that function (ii) p ∈ argmax p 0 :V→∆ n+1 Q(p 0 , Z * ), and (iii) x is selected to make U 0 (v 0 ) = CV * − v 0 and U t i (0) = 0 for each buyer i = 1, . . . n and any period t = 1, 2, .... Namely,
Proof. By Theorem 1, Z * = U * M + CV * is maximized if
By Lemma 3, there exists a unique solution of (16) . Since by Lemma 2,
parts (ii) and (iii) follow from Theorem 1. End of Proof.
Note that by (ii) every mediator-optimal mechanism allocates the object according to the same rule p which grants the object to the bidder with the highest use value 
Expected Payoff of the Mediator
In the previous section we described the mediator-optimal mechanism as a function of the continuation value CV * . We shall now select CV * which maximize the (unconditional) expected payoff of the mediator, U M , and then derive the desired optimal mechanism (p, x).
Since for v 0 > CV * the seller does not auction the object, and thus the mediator receives zero, we have
The mediator's expected unconditional payoff U M is equal to the product of the mediator's expected gain conditional on v 0 ≤ CV * , U * M , and the probability that v 0 ≤ CV * , F s (CV * ). We have U * M = Z * − CV * , where Z * , the highest joint gain of the mediator and the seller, is independent from the mechanism (p, x). Hence, CV * must be a solution of the following optimization problem,
That is, the expected revenue of the mediator U * M conditional on the event that the auction occurs will balance two opposite forces: The higher the (conditional) mediator revenue, U * M = Z * − CV * , the lower the probability that the seller is willing to auction the object, F s (CV * ).
From (17) and Corollary 1 we obtain the following theorem. (ii) The expected payoff of the mediator is given by 
Implementation
In this section we demonstrate that a mediator-optimal mechanism is implementable by a repeated Vickrey auction with a reserve price, where the mediator collects her payoff via a simple fee scheme.
Consider the following mechanism, the Closing-fee Internet auction. In every period, the mediator runs a Vickrey auction with a reserve price. The seller submits a reserve price, r, and every bidder submits a bid equal to her true use value. The winning bidder (if any) pays the greater of the second highest bid and the reserve price. If the object is sold, the mediator collects a closing fee (a percentage from the closing price),
where U * M = Z * − CV * , Z * and CV * are defined in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3
The Closing-fee Internet auction is optimal for the mediator. 
and the object is retained by the seller if r * > v i for all i = 1, . . . , n, or,
Theorem 3 describes the mediator-optimal Internet auction with just one fee. However, most of the real-life Internet auctions have two fees: A closing fee, μ, and a listing fee, c ∈ R, a fixed fee collected at the beginning of every auction. In Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2006), we obtain the following result. 
Extensions of the model
We discuss several extensions of the model in this section.
Collusion of the Seller and the Mediator
Suppose that the seller and the mediator collude. 5 
subject to
From Lemma 3, we obtain
Therefore, the mediator's continuation value is Z * . Since Z * > CV * , the auction occurs with higher probability than in the case of the mediator and a seller being independent. Hence, the expected joint gain of an independent seller and the mediator is less than the expected joint gain of them colluding.
Maintenance Fees
Suppose that the mediator has to pay a fixed maintenance fee η ≥ 0 in order to run an auction each period. Again, the seller auctions the object, if v 0 ≤ CV η and consumes it, if v 0 > CV η . Then the expected payoff of the mediator at any period t, conditional on v 0 ≤ CV η is
Theorem 4 Suppose that the seller's realized use value v 0 ≤ CV η . Then at any period t ≥ 1, every feasible mechanism (p, x) satisfies
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 and omitted here.
The mediator-optimal mechanisms w.r.t CV η , if v 0 ≤ CV η , is similar to those one described in Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 Let CV η be given and suppose that v 0 ≤ CV η . Let 0 ≤ η ≤ Q * (0). A feasible mechanism (p, x) is mediator-optimal w.r.t. CV η if
Again, the joint seller-mediator gain Z η is maximized first, then this gain is divided between the seller and the mediator. Following the proof of Lemma 3, we obtain that Z η is the unique solution of the following equation
By assumption, η ≤ δT (0) = Q * (0). It is straightforward to see that the total gain in this case, Z η , is a decreasing function of the fee η, because Z η is a unique intersection of the increasing and decreasing functions in the equation (24).
Hence, CV η must be a solution of the following optimization problem
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5 A feasible mechanism (p, x) with maintenance fee η, 0 ≤ η ≤ Q * (0), is mediator-optimal if and only if (i) The expected joint gain of the mediator and the seller is a unique solution
(ii) The expected payoff of the mediator is given by
CV η as in (25).
The One-Period Model
Let us consider a special case where the seller is constrained to auction the object at most one time. This one-period model is a direct extension of Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) bilateral (one seller and one buyer)
trade, mediated by a "broker", to the n-buyer problem.
Suppose that for any v 0 ∈ [0, 1] the seller auctions the object in the first period (α 1 (v 0 ) = 1) and never re-auctions it (α t (v 0 ) = 0 for all t = 2, 3, . . .).
For convenience, in all notations of this section we omit the affix referring to period 1. We normalize payoffs by selecting δ = 1.
In a direct revelation mechanism, given v i , the expected utility of bidder i = 1, . . . , n is defined by
the expected gain from trade for the seller is defined by
and the expected utility of the mediator is defined by
Denote by C b (v i ) the virtual value of bidder i, i = 1, . . . , n, and denote by C s (v 0 ) the virtual value of the seller. Namely, C b is defined above in (12) and C s is given for every v 0 ∈ [0, 1] by
We assume that C b (·) is strictly increasing (the Myerson's regularity condition) and, in addition, assume that C s (·) is strictly increasing. Define
The following theorem and corollaries are a straightforward generalization of Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) . We omit the proofs.
Theorem 6 Every feasible mechanism (p, x) satisfies
In particular, Theorem 6 demonstrates that the expected payoff of the mediator depends only on the rule of the object allocation, p, and on the payoffs of players with the extreme private use values. This yields the following result of revenue equivalence. It follows from Theorem 6 that a mediator-optimal mechanism maximizes W (p), that is, the allocation rule p grants the object to the trader with the highest virtual value. Thus, we have the following corollary (see also Myerson, 1981; and Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) . 6 I.e., the object allocation rule and the expected payoffs of the players are the same.
Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion of some model assumptions.
1. It is crucial for our results that in every period the seller faces the same trade environment and, thus, he has the same expected payoff. How the trade environment is modelled is unimportant. Consequently, our results
can be applied to a considerably wider class of problems. For instance, the number of bidders drawn in every period may be random, as long as it is identically distributed across periods.
2. The assumption that the mechanism is fixed and stationary is essential for our results. The real life supports this assumption: in all Internet auctions the rules and fees are fixed.
3. In our model a winning bidder is not allowed to re-auction the object.
Adding this possibility for a winning bidder would not make any effect on the mediator-optimal mechanism, since the winning bidder will face the same stationary environment in the next period. This contrasts our results to Zheng (2002) , who assumes that a fixed, finite set of bidders is involved in trade, thus, the initial seller and a winning bidder face different trade environments.
4. We assume that the auction mediator is a monopolist. It is interesting, however, to consider the situation with several competing mediators, and relate the results to the study of two-sided markets mediated by "platforms" (e.g, Rochet and Tirole, 2003) . We are investigating that now and will report our results elsewhere.
It follows for w t i = v t i − ε and arbitrary ε > 0 that 
Proof. Using (1) and Lemma 4 we obtain
